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1. Introduction 
This article engages with two contrasting narratives1 relating to private controls on land use: one in 
which such controls are seen as an efficient, ‘bottom up’ means of regulation and another in which 
they are criticised as typifying an unaccountable, exploitative relation in which ecological interests are 
subordinated to those of capital. It aims to contribute to debates around the role of private landowners 
in nature conservation by means of a critical assessment of the Law Commission’s 2014 proposals for 
a new statutory burden on land in England and Wales, the ‘conservation covenant’.2 It is submitted 
that this can be understood as one manifestation of a form of environmental governance3 ‘involving 
the totality of interactions between public and private actors, and the state no longer playing a central 
role in decision-making.’4 By allowing private parties to agree and enforce long-term conservation 
measures, the conservation covenant could provide new opportunities for participation in conservation 
activity; the article questions, however, whether the private and voluntary character of the mechanism 
may jeopardise its ability to deliver the public environmental and social benefits cited as justifications 
for reform. A central claim of the article is that protection of these public interests requires that more 
attention be given to questions of environmental justice, in particular to the fair distribution of 
information and opportunities for participation. More generally, it is suggested that it is difficult to 
address the social and political dimensions of land-use conflicts adequately within the adjudicative 
structures associated with private law relationships; caution is therefore required regarding the part 
that conservation covenants should play in conservation policy. 
 
After outlining the structure of the proposed covenant mechanism, the article positions it within the 
context of broader moves to create markets in environmental goods and services, for example through 
the institution of tradeable biodiversity credits in environmental compensation schemes. The potential 
for the proposals to empower private conservation activity is contrasted with the abstraction and 
closure that is argued to inhere in commodified private property relations: a private agreement would, 
by its nature, exclude consideration of a range of social and ecological interests.  It is contended that 
reliance on private initiative could risk the displacement of certain communities from control over 
                                                          
1 The distinction between ‘narrative[s] of capital’ and ‘narrative[s] of community’ is drawn by Giles Mohan and 
Kristian Stokke, ‘Participatory Development and Empowerment: The Dangers of Localism’ (2000) 21 Third 
World Quarterly 247, 250.  
2 Law Commission, Covenants (Law Com No 349, 2014). 
3 The term ‘governance’ is used here to reference a wider range of regulatory strategies and actors that 
traditional state-centred models of regulation; see Neil Gunningham, ‘Environment Law, Regulation and 
Governance: Shifting Architectures’ (2009) 21 JEL 179, 203. 
4 ibid. 
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which sites are protected and in what manner, raising questions of environmental justice. There is no 
easy way to reconcile these contradictions, but it is suggested that the potential of the covenant 
mechanism to enable conservation activity of genuine public benefit would be increased if, rather than 
approaching covenant creation as solely an exercise of private power, more emphasis were to be 
placed upon principles of administrative governance such as transparency, accountability and 
legitimacy.  
 
For this reason, the article asserts that equitable and inclusive public participation could play a limited 
but crucial role in securing the legitimacy of any future reform, and perhaps also its environmental 
effectiveness. The penultimate section highlights opportunities for better collection and dissemination 
of information about covenants and for the involvement of a more diverse range of actors in 
monitoring and enforcement. If public regulation were to incentivise or require the creation of 
conservation covenants, effective oversight would be crucial to the legitimacy of the system. Even 
under an entirely voluntary scheme, greater public engagement would help to ensure that, were 
conflicts to arise, covenants would be perceived as playing a just and transparent role in the decision-
making process. The bipolarity of the covenant relationship and the ‘agenda-setting’5 power of the 
landowner restrict, however, the ability of conservation covenants to serve as a substitute for the 
public regulation of land use: private agreements are ultimately an unsatisfactory way of determining 
public conservation priorities. It is concluded that this reflects a more general limit to the ability of 
property mechanisms to provide environmental justice.  
 
2. Conservation Covenants: The Law Commission Proposals 
2.1 Proprietary effect 
The terminology used varies across jurisdictions (devices similar to the conservation covenant may be 
referred to as ‘conservation easements’,6 ‘conservation burdens’7 or ‘conservation servitudes’8), but 
                                                          
5 The owner’s ‘agenda-setting’ role is highlighted by Larissa Katz, ‘Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law’ 
(2008) 58(3) UTLJ 275. 
6 The term ‘conservation easement’ in the United States is generally used to refer to a device similar to the 
proposed ‘covenant’. On the preference for ‘easement’, see Gerald Korngold, ‘Globalizing Conservation 
Easements: Private Law Approaches for International Environmental Protection’ (2011) 28 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 585, 594. 
7 See Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 9) ss 38-42; Colin T Reid, ‘Conservation burdens and 
covenants’ (2014) 165 SPEL 108. 
8 ‘Servitude de conservation’ is sometimes used as a French translation of ‘conservation easement’, see eg 
Commissariat Général au Développement Durable, Sécuriser des engagements environnementaux: Séminaire 
d'échange sur les outils fonciers complémentaires à l'acquisition (Études & documents no 82, April 2011) 9. 
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the Commission’s proposals are essentially concerned with the idea of an environmental obligation 
that can function as a burden on land. According to its Report:  
 
A conservation covenant is an agreement made between a landowner and a conservation body 
which ensures the conservation of natural or heritage features on the land. It is a private and 
voluntary arrangement made in the public interest, which continues to be effective even after 
the land changes hands.9 
 
The most important feature of a covenant is its ability to provide long term security for environmental 
benefits through the creation of conservation obligations enforceable against successors in title.10 
These would take effect as a form of statutory burden on land rather than as one of the legal interests 
in land enumerated in s 1 of the Law of Property Act 1925.11 Pratt, however, makes a cogent 
argument that, in the proposed form, a conservation covenant could nevertheless be included within 
the category of proprietary (as opposed to personal) rights.12 The main distinction between the 
proposed mechanism and the existing restrictive freehold covenant is that a conservation covenant 
would not require to benefit a dominant parcel of land, it could also include positive obligations that 
bind successors.13  
 
Given the emphasis placed upon the stability and permanence of the covenant structure, a central 
challenge faced by any reform is how to combine this with flexibility and responsiveness to 
environmental and social change. The Law Commission propose that modification or discharge of a 
covenant could be achieved by application to the Lands Chamber of the Upper Tribunal, who, after 
having regard to a number of factors including changes to the character of the land and the extent to 
which the performance of the obligation remains affordable and practicable, would decide on the basis 
of what is reasonable.14 Later in the article, it is argued that the legal construction of disputes about 
covenant modification and discharge as concerning principally the burdened landowner and 
                                                          
9 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 1.1. 
10 This is identified by Hodge as ‘critical’: Ian Hodge, ‘Conservation Covenants: A Policy Perspective’ (2013) 
Conv. 490, 491. 
11 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 2.97. 
12 Natalie Pratt, ‘Conservation covenants: a proprietary analysis’ (2014) Conv 328. 
13 See Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 2.66 and, on restrictive freehold covenants, Kevin Gray and 
Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th edn, OUP 2009) paras 3.4.20-3.4.27. These rules are features of 
land burdens in many legal systems; for comparative discussion see S van Erp and B Akkermans (eds), Cases, 
Materials and Text on Property Law (Hart 2012) 245. 
14 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) paras 7.71-7.79. 
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responsible body may limit the range of public interests that will be considered.15 A more open and 
plural process would be better equipped to cope with ecological change and complexity.  
 
2.2 Public benefit and the role of responsible bodies 
 
Despite the ‘private and voluntary’16 character of the proposed covenant, the public and collective 
significance of land-use decision-making provides an important justification for its introduction. A 
conservation covenant should have a conservation purpose and be for the public good.17 It is ‘the 
public interest in conservation’, as well as ‘the enthusiasm of landowners to protect important features 
on their land’,18 that requires the creation of a new mechanism. Covenants could provide opportunities 
for local communities to protect important environmental or historic features. Among the principal 
potential uses identified by the Law Commission are facilitation of philanthropy and preservation of 
‘heritage’ and ‘community’ assets.19 In sections four and five, the contrasting narratives introduced in 
the opening lines are used to explore the risks and benefits of adopting private law means to further 
these public ends. Which publics and which goods are likely to profit from reform? 
In order to ensure that these conservation purposes are realised, the Commission proposals afford an 
extensive role to non-governmental organisations in the monitoring and enforcement of conservation 
covenants. The principal means of guaranteeing that the scheme will provide the promised 
environmental benefits is regulation of the ‘responsible bodies’ who may enforce the obligations 
contained in a covenant. The Law Commission suggest that local authorities, public bodies and 
charitable organisations should be permitted to become responsible bodies in accordance with criteria 
specified by the Secretary of State.20 This is similar to the Scottish system under which only a limited 
number of bodies can enforce a conservation burden, allaying fears about overburdening of land and 
proliferation of inutile restrictions.21 It does, however, raise questions, explored in the penultimate 
section, about the extent to which it might be desirable for a wider range of individuals and 
organisations to be able to participate in the monitoring and enforcement process. 
 
2.3. Voluntary nature 
                                                          
15 See 6.5 below.  
16 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 1.1. 
17 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) paras 3.17-3.38. 
18 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 1.3. 
19 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) paras 2.8-2.11; 2.12. 
20 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 4.57. 
21 See Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003, s 38(4); Reid, ‘Conservation burdens’ (n 7). 
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Although the proposed covenant is characterised by the Law Commission as a voluntary, 
uncompensated and private mechanism, it is acknowledged by observers that, without some form of 
incentivisation, conservation covenants might not be widely used.22 Even if covenants were initially 
popular, it seems probable that the difficulty (and potentially the cost) of protecting land would rise 
over time, as the supply of suitable land and willing landowners diminished.23 In the United States, 
tax incentives been crucial in encouraging the creation of conservation easements.24 According to 
Reid, the Scottish experience has been that few conservation burdens have been created, with the 
majority relating to ‘cultural heritage’ such as historic buildings and a preference for comparatively 
short durations over perpetual obligations.25 This may reflect the lack of obvious motivators such as 
favourable taxation and perhaps also unfamiliarity with the possibilities of a new mechanism.  
 
There are, in addition, significant differences between the use of voluntary obligations by landowners 
already inclined towards conservation, as under for example the model used by Australia’s Forest 
Conservation Fund,26 and imposition of covenants during, for example, public planning processes.27 If 
conservation covenants were to be incentivised or exacted by public regulation, this would amplify 
the concerns raised below regarding legitimacy and environmental justice. Research on voluntarily 
created conservation restrictions in Massachusetts has identified that most of the restrictions surveyed 
probably did not impose substantial changes on the use of the land.28  Questions of monitoring and 
                                                          
22 See eg Colin T Reid, ‘The Privatisation of Biodiversity? Possible New Approaches to Nature Conservation 
Law in the UK’ (2011) 23 JEL 203, 214; Natalie Pratt, ‘Analysing conservation covenants’ (2014) JPL 1310, 
1315.  
23 This appears to have been the experience in Tasmania: M S Iftekhar et al, ‘Private lands for biodiversity 
conservation: Review of conservation covenanting programs in Tasmania, Australia’ (2014) 169 Biological 
Conservation 176. 
24 Raymond and Fairfax characterise the situation in the United States as representing a blurring of boundaries 
between public and private rather than a straightforward shift towards the private: Leigh Raymond and Sally K 
Fairfax, ‘The ‘Shift to Privatization’ in Land Conservation: A Cautionary Essay’ (2002) 42 Natural Resources 
Journal 600, 626-628. Jeff Pidot, ‘Reinventing Conservation Easements’ Policy Focus Report, Lincoln Institute 
of Land Policy (2005) 4 and Gerald Korngold, ‘Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation 
Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Land Use Process’ (2007) Utah L Rev 
1039 highlight the role of public subsidy in encouraging creation of conservation easements. 
25 Reid, ‘Conservation Burdens’ (n 7) 109.  
26 On the merits of the Australian model, see Charlie Zammit, ‘Landowners and conservation markets: Social 
benefits from two Australian government programs’ (2013) 31 Land Use Policy 11, 12.  
27 This is one possibility mentioned by the Law Commission: Covenants (n 2) para 1.14. 
28 Zachary Bray, ‘Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of Conservation 
Easements’ (2010) 34 Harv Envtl L Rev 119, 174. Similar findings are mentioned by Adena R Rissman and 
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enforcement would become especially pressing if covenants were to be used to pursue environmental 
goals that were perceived as contrary to landowners’ interests or current land-use practices. The 
gathering of environmental information, despite its associated costs, could be beneficial to landowners 
who are personally interested in the conservation status of their land but would be likely to be 
perceived as an extra burden if covenants were to be imposed in conditions attached to grants of 
planning permission.29 This could reduce the quality of the protection afforded: in the context of 
mitigation measures under the Habitats Directive, McGillivray has raised concerns that reluctantly 
gathered information might underestimate ecological value.30  
3. Context: Biodiversity Offsetting 
  
This section asserts a link between the proposed reforms and what is characterised as a drive towards 
the creation of markets in environmental goods and services.31 Discussion focuses on the role of 
covenants in providing legal security for environmental compensation measures or ‘offsets’.32 One of 
the key advantages mentioned by the Law Commission of a new mechanism is its potential to 
contribute to the biodiversity offsetting scheme piloted in six English local authorities between 2012 
and 2014.33 It is not yet clear how these pilots, or indeed the Commission proposals, will affect 
government policy,34 but facilitation of offsetting was identified by the Department for Environment, 
                                                          
Nathan F Sayre, ‘Conservation Outcomes and Social Relations: A Comparative Study of Private Ranchland 
Conservation Easements’ (2011) 25 Society and Natural Resources 523, 529. The forest preservation easement 
described by Laurie A Wayburn, ‘Conservation Easements as Tools to Achieve Regulatory Environmental 
Goals’ (2011) 74 LCP 175 also involves the landowner facing reduced regulatory requirements. 
29 Contrast Zammit’s description of social benefits in ‘Landowners’ (n 26) 14 with the difficulties of negotiating 
biodiversity compensation in the context of a planning application, ‘the delivery of […which] relies on finding 
various hooks such as non-biodiversity planning reasons, presence of protected species [etc.].’ (Collingwood 
Environmental Planning Ltd, Evaluation of the Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot Phase - Indicative Costs of Current 
Compensation Arrangements for Biodiversity Loss: Illustrative Case Studies (2013) para 4.4.)  
30 Donald McGillivray, ‘Compensating Biodiversity Loss: The EU Commission’s Approach to Compensation 
under Article 6 of the Habitats Directive’ (2012) 24 JEL 417, 428. 
31 For an introduction to debates in this area, see the papers collected in Transnational Environmental Law 
(2013) vol 2 and Colin T Reid and Walters Nsoh, The Privatisation of Biodiversity: New Approaches to Nature 
Conservation Law (Edward Elgar 2016) chs 1 and 2. 
32 On biodiversity offsetting generally, see Reid and Nsoh, Privatisation (n 31) ch 4. 
33 See Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) paras 2.26-2.55. On the pilots, see DEFRA, Biodiversity Offsetting in 
England (Green paper, 2013) and evaluation reports and research available at https://www.gov.uk/biodiversity-
offsetting.  
34 At the time of writing, DEFRA had not yet published its forthcoming 25-year plan. 
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Food and Rural Affairs (‘DEFRA’) in the 2011 ‘Natural Environment’ White Paper,35 as a ‘key 
reform’ needed for protecting and improving the natural environment.36 Offsetting is defined by 
DEFRA as ‘conservation activities designed to deliver biodiversity benefits in compensation for 
losses in a measurable way.’37 The usual context is the loss of biodiversity in the course of land-use 
change; the creation of an ‘offset’ allows a developer to compensate for the damage caused by 
undertaking conservation or restoration activities elsewhere. Depending on the type of scheme 
adopted, offsetting raises the possibility that offsets could be created, and in some cases ‘banked’ for 
future use, in return for financial gain.38 Despite the current lack of formal national provision, in 
England offsets can be arranged, and biodiversity ‘credits’ bought and sold, via brokers such as the 
Environment Bank Ltd.39 
 
These structures are part of a broader move towards what has been described as the 
‘financialisation’40 of ecological functions and the promotion of the concepts of ‘ecosystem 
services’41 and ‘natural capital’42, reflected in the creation following the White Paper of a Natural 
Capital Committee to advise on the valuation of ecosystem services43 and an Ecosystems Markets 
Task Force to develop markets in ecosystem services and ‘green’ investment opportunities.44 The key 
                                                          
35 DEFRA, The Natural Choice: securing the value of nature (White Paper, Cm 8082, 2011). In Scotland plans 
to develop a more formal structure for biodiversity offsetting were put on hold after concerns were raised during 
consultation; see The 2020 Challenge for Scotland’s Biodiversity - Consultation Report (2013) 6 and A 
Consultation on the 2020 Challenge for Scotland's Biodiversity: An Analysis of Consultation Responses (2013) 
paras 3.14-3.28. 
36 DEFRA, Natural Choice (n 35) 15. 
37 DEFRA, Natural Choice (n 35) para 2.38. 
38 On ‘biobanking’ schemes, see Reid and Nsoh, Privatisation (n 31) para 4.7. 
39 See http://www.environmentbank.com.  
40 See eg Sian Sullivan, ‘Banking Nature? The Spectacular Financialisation of Environmental Conservation’ 
(2013) 45 Antipode 198. 
41 Broadly, this represents a view of the relation between human and environment in which ecosystems are 
characterised as providers of ‘provisioning’, ‘regulating’, ‘cultural’ and ‘support’ services: DEFRA, Natural 
Choice (n 35) para 1.7. See further The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), Mainstreaming the 
Economics of Nature: A Synthesis of the Approach, Conclusions and Recommendations of TEEB (2010).  
42 See the publications of the Natural Capital Committee and eg D Helm, ‘Taking natural capital seriously’ 
(2014) 30 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 109. 
43 DEFRA, Natural Choice (n 35) para 3.11.  See the Committee’s website at 
https://www.naturalcapitalcommittee.org/ and the reports The State of Natural Capital: Towards a Framework 
of Measurement and Valuation (2013) and The State of Natural Capital: Restoring our Natural Assets (2014). 
44 DEFRA, Natural Choice (n 35) para 3.28. 
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contention of this approach is that, rather than making unrealistic attempts to halt depletion entirely, 
policymakers should develop metrics and balance sheets that allow adequate quantification of the 
natural resources depleted and provide for compensation to ensure that the total supply is 
maintained.45 For example, in biodiversity offsetting metrics permit ‘the compensation requirement to 
be quickly calculated, rather than expensively negotiated on a case-by-case basis’.46  
 
It is not yet known whether any nationwide biodiversity offsetting scheme would restrict offset 
locations to the same locality (e.g. the same local authority area) as the harm to be offset but the 
logical implication of a market approach is that offsets should take place in the most economically 
efficient location. For example, Helm emphasises preservation of the aggregate stock of natural 
capital rather than any particular asset as a central tenet of the offsetting calculus.47  This raises 
concerns around what Ruhl and Salzman refer to as the ‘nonfungibility of space’: conservation 
activity in one location is not necessarily equivalent to conservation in another.48  
 
Property structures are an essential component of trade in environmental goods and services.49 Given 
the legal security associated with proprietary rights, property mechanisms are often perceived as a 
robust means of ensuring that investments in environmental projects are protected over the long 
term.50 For example, recent French legislation providing for biodiversity offsetting also introduced a 
new conservation burden (obligation réelle environnementale) that may be used to secure offset 
sites.51 In principle, the proposed conservation covenant could perform a similar function, protecting 
the biodiversity values of offset sites and facilitating the development of an effective market.52 It 
                                                          
45 See sources at n 42. 
46 DEFRA, Offsetting (n 33) para 7. For the metric used in the pilots, see DEFRA, Technical paper: The metric 
for the biodiversity offsetting pilot in England (2012). 
47 See Helm, ‘Natural capital’ (n 42) 117-118.  
48 James Salzman and J B Ruhl, ‘Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law’ (2000) 53 Stan L 
Rev 607, 627-631; 665-666 (distributive justice implications). 
49 A point highlighted by Reid and Nsoh, Privatisation (n 31) para 2.9. 
50 See eg Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 1.8. Wayburn, ‘Easements’ (n 28) 194 notes that carbon 
offsets secured by easements command higher prices in California due to the perceived quality of the security 
offered. 
51 See Loi n° 2016-1087 du 8 août 2016 pour la reconquête de la biodiversité, de la nature et des paysages, Art 
72. For an overview of the reforms in English, see O Darses, ‘France's new biodiversity law and 
implications for no net loss of biodiversity’, available at http://bbop.forest-trends.org/pages/webinars.  
52 DEFRA, Guiding Principles for Biodiversity Offsetting (2011) 3-4 states that offsets should be provided ‘in 
perpetuity’. Possibilities for using covenants to secure biodiversity gains are discussed at 22-23. The 
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could also allow offsets to be undertaken outside the area of the local authority in which a damaging 
development was to take place, something that would be more complicated using existing alternatives 
such as planning agreements.53 The Commission proposals exclude for-profit organisations from 
acting as responsible bodies;54 there remains, however, the possibility of ‘substantial potential 
commercial application’55 if future rules were to permit for-profit arrangements (for example in the 
context of ‘payment for eco-system services’).56 Although not specifically mentioned by the 
Commission, it seems likely that conservation covenants would be used to protect carbon 
sequestration activities, which could then give rise to carbon offsets potentially tradeable as credits 
where appropriate markets exist.57  
 
4. Narratives of Community: Private Action for the Public Good 
 
4.1 Connection with nature and environmentally responsible landownership 
Implicit in these moves towards the use of market mechanisms is a potential for increased 
involvement of private actors as market participants, administrators and even regulators.58 The 
contrasting narratives introduced at the outset illustrate the differing ways in which this shift might be 
interpreted: in one sense, it could be seen as empowering, in another alienating. This section assesses 
the extent to which the Commission proposals might further participation in environmental protection, 
arguing that, despite the clear possible benefits of involving a wide range of actors in terms of 
                                                          
Commission’s proposals are referred to as a part of a potential offsetting system in DEFRA, Biodiversity 
Offsetting (n 33) para 46. 
53 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 2.49. On planning agreements, see s 106 Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990 and Victor Moore and Michael Purdue, A Practical Approach to Planning Law (13th edn, OUP 2015) 
ch 17.  
54 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) paras 4.55-4.58. 
55 Response of the Central Association for Agricultural Valuers to the Law Commission Consultation, cited in 
Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 4.46. 
56 DEFRA, Payment for Eco-system Services: A Best Practice Guide (2013) 64-65 highlights conservation 
covenants as a possible legal mechanism to secure an obligation to provide eco-system services. 
57 See Hodge, ‘Covenants’ (n 10) 493. Easements have been required to secure certain carbon offsets in 
California:  Kelly Kay, ‘Breaking the bundle of rights: Conservation easements and the legal geographies of 
individuating nature’ (2015) 48(3) Environment and Planning A 504, 516-517; James L Olmstead, ‘Carbon 
Dieting: Latent Ancillary Rights to Carbon Offsets in Conservation Easements’ (2009) 29 Journal of Land, 
Resources and Environmental Law 121.  
58 For analysis of these shifts in governance, see Gunningham, ‘Governance’ (n 3) and Reid and Nsoh, 
Privatisation (n 31) para 2.14. 
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knowledge and legitimacy, important questions remain regarding distributive justice and 
accountability. 
 
From one perspective, conservation covenants could provide a means of reconciling traditional 
abstracted notions of landownership with a recognition that ownership may (and indeed for both 
practical and ethical reasons must) coexist with duties to protect the environment.59 Among others, 
Rodgers has highlighted the ‘dynamic’ role that property rules can play in environmental regulation;60 
even before the Law Commission proposals, Gray and Gray argued that  
 
[t]here is, in […] English law, increasing reason to believe that the so-called neighbour 
burden is beginning to come into its own, not as a device for the imposition of the selfish or 
isolated or eccentric individualist protectionist impulse, but rather as the longstop guardian of 
a more general, community-spirited, conservationist concern.61  
 
There are strong arguments for encouraging private landowners to become involved in 
environmentally sound land management; research in Australia has identified benefits including 
development of ecological consciousness and creation of new social networks and communities of 
conservation-minded individuals and organisations.62 Indeed, a central concern of the Natural Choice 
White Paper is the facilitation and encouragement of ‘connection with nature’:63 voluntary 
conservation action by individuals and businesses can be seen as part of a virtuous circle in which 
those involved will gain a greater understanding of nature’s value and be more likely to act to protect 
it in future.64 Responsibility for conservation thus becomes shared rather than primarily a function of 
the state, with any landowner able to participate by selecting his or her land for protection.65 The 
                                                          
59 See eg Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, ‘The idea of property in land’, in S Bright and J Dewar (ed), 
Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (OUP 1998) 15, 41 and for fuller discussion of the notion of ‘stewardship’ 
and further references Emily Barritt, ‘Conceptualising Stewardship in Environmental Law’ (2014) 26 JEL 1. 
60 Christopher Rodgers, ‘Nature’s Place? Property Rights, Property Rules and Environmental Stewardship’ 
(2009) 68 CLJ 550. 
61 Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, ‘The Future of Real Burdens in Scots Law’ (1999) 3 Edinburgh Law 
Review 229, 232.  
62 Zammit, ‘Landowners’ (n 26) 14-15. See also Chris Harrington et al, ‘Learning Conservation: the role of 
conservation covenants in landscape redesign at Project Hindmarsh, Victoria’ (2006) 37(2) Australian 
Geographer 187. 
63 See eg DEFRA, Natural Choice (n 35) ch 4. 
64 Although not stated explicitly, this is arguably one of the underlying assumptions of the White Paper, see eg 
DEFRA, Natural Choice (n 35) para 4.38.  
65 For examination of this shift, see Reid, ‘Privatisation’ (n 23) 227. 
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political implications of such a shift are examined further below, but given pressure on state 
resources,66 voluntary action by those actually present on the land may appear to be the only realistic 
way to ensure that environmental objectives are actually met.67  
 
It may also extend the focus of conservation activities beyond the relatively narrower range of 
protected sites covered under existing legislation.68  Ecological fragmentation currently presents major 
risks to the survival of species and habitats.69 As Bell, McGillivray and Pedersen put it, ‘it is now 
accepted that there is little future in having isolated areas of protected wildlife in an otherwise barren 
landscape’.70 Covenants may be one way of securing ecological ‘corridors’ on land where ecosystems 
cannot be regulated in some other way71 and could support large-scale conservation initiatives where 
it is not possible or desirable for all the land involved to be owned outright by conservation bodies.72  
 
Notwithstanding this potential, the voluntary nature of the Commission proposals implies that such 
gains would be by no means assured. Incentives may well be necessary to facilitate wide participation, 
but the greater the public expenditure incurred supporting covenants, the more important the 
governance-related issues addressed in sections five and six below would become.  It is further 
important to consider which communities are, due to their existing knowledge and skills, best placed 
to exploit these opportunities. What benefits would conservation covenants bring to those who do not 
own land, or to those landowners unable to afford to change land-use practices?  
 
4.2 Involvement of non-state bodies 
 
A further attraction of the Commission proposals is that they would allow approved conservation 
charities to secure protection of large areas of land without taking ownership. This could provide 
                                                          
66 Whether or not there is an absolute scarcity of resources, resource allocation usually involves choice between 
competing objectives; indeed, this is (presumably intentionally) emphasised by the title of the White Paper. 
67 In the US context, for example, Wayburn argues that a forest conservation easement held by a land trust 
increased the net resources available for conservation activities: ‘Easements’ (n 28) 190. 
68 For an overview of current legislation, see Christopher P Rodgers, The Law of Nature Conservation (OUP 
2013) ch 3.   
69 See European Environment Agency, Fragmentation of natural and semi-natural areas (2015). Data available 
at http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/fragmentation-of-natural-and-semi-1/assessment-1.  
70 Stuart Bell, Donald McGillivray and Ole W Pedersen, Environmental Law (8th edn, OUP 2013) 720. 
71 See Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) paras 2.15-2.16 and for examples in the US see eg Adena R Rissman, 
‘Rethinking Property Rights: Comparative Analysis of Conservation Easements for Wildlife Conservation’ 
(2013) 40 Environmental Conservation 222, 227; Bray, ‘Reconciling” (n 28) 166. 
72 A point made by Hodge, ‘Covenants’ (n 10) 499-500. 
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resource efficiencies for the organisations involved;73 the presence of civil society groups again brings 
opportunities for collaboration, information sharing and the creation of new communities and 
networks. For example, the role played by non-governmental organisations in accessing local 
knowledge and building community awareness has been identified as one of the strong points of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) regime.74 
Non-state bodies such as environmental charities may be perceived to have legitimacy not available to 
state actors;75 ‘many landowners may prefer to agree a conservation covenant with a charity than with 
an arm of the state.’76  
 
The diffusion of power, however, entails a certain amount of risk, which raises important questions 
regarding ultimate responsibility for the ecological and social consequences of a covenant (or its 
failure). Even under an entirely voluntary scheme, the role of the state has changed rather than 
disappearing entirely: the governmental approval of responsible bodies remains a crucial guarantor of 
legitimacy and suitability.  No public oversight of the content of covenants at the point of creation is 
recommended by the Law Commission, but it is recognised that this could change if covenants were 
to be used in biodiversity offsetting.77 There remains a fundamental difference between the public 
land-use planning system and a system based on private agreements. Particularly over the long term, it 
might be difficult to ensure that responsible bodies allocate adequate resources to monitoring and 
enforcement of covenants that they hold.78 As Korngold notes, the non-profit sector in the United 
States is particularly large and well resourced; United States’ models of holding and enforcement of 
easements may not work so well in other jurisdictions.79 Lack of resources is not, of course, a problem 
unique to non-governmental bodies but the question of accountability is more difficult. Although 
                                                          
73 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 2.16. There has been insufficient analysis of the long-term costs of 
holding a covenant compared to owning the land outright: Green Balance Report to the National Trust, The 
Potential of Conservation Covenants (2008) 6. In the US, obtaining a conservation easement may cost 70-90% 
of the cost of purchasing the property outright: Rissman, ‘Rethinking’ (n 71) 226. 
74 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘NGOs and the environment: From knowledge to Action’ (1997) 18(3) Third World 
Quarterly 579, 587. 
75 For example, Gunningham cites legitimacy as a benefit of community collaboration: ‘Governance’ (n 3) 207. 
76 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 4.57. 
77 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 4.100. If covenants were to be imposed as part of the planning 
process, the local planning authority might play a role in monitoring. 
78 For a more detailed exploration of some of the challenges that may face the voluntary sector, see Hadrian 
Cook and Alax Inman, ‘The voluntary sector and conservation for England: Achievements, expanding roles and 
uncertain future’ (2012) 112 Journal of Environmental Management 170.   
79 Korngold, ‘Globalizing’ (n 6) 614-615.   
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charitable organisations are subject to oversight by trustees and the Charity Commission,80 they are 
not democratically accountable in the same way as a local authority. What follows argues that these 
issues of legitimacy and accountability are part of a more general difficulty with the use of private 
mechanisms to further public interests.  
 
5. Narratives of capital: Commodification and Environmental Justice  
5.1 Commodification, abstraction and displacement 
 
The features of the proposed covenant that make it a suitable foundation for trade in environmental 
goods and services may limit the extent to which it can take full account of the complexities of 
ecological and social systems. This section builds on commodification-based critiques81 to argue that 
the certainty and security provided by proprietary mechanisms is likely to be based on the exclusion 
of a range of human and non-human interests. Castree identifies a number of possible dimensions to 
commodification processes:  privatisation, alienability, individuation, abstraction, valuation and 
displacement.82  Although Castree’s work is situated within a particular Marxian tradition and is not 
exhaustive of possible understandings of or responses to commodification, it is used here as a lens 
through which to examine the narrowing of focus that accompanies the creation of private property 
rights, and the possible environmental justice implications of this process.  
 
Although they do not require the transfer of land from public to private ownership (privatisation); the 
Commission proposals are predicated on private control over environmental values. A landowner 
could choose to destroy the goods in question rather than protect them with a conservation covenant. 
This focus on private interest risks spatial and social displacement of persons from their ecological 
contexts. Local communities could be physically excluded from land protected by a covenant, but 
would also be excluded from decision-making and access to information about the management of 
that land, obscuring of the network of ecological relationships which sustain the community as a 
whole. Adoption of a private property-based perspective could foster mistrust of public ownership and 
management and an unwillingness on the part of landowners to accept public regulation.  
Governments might use the existence of private mechanisms as an excuse to reduce the state funding 
                                                          
80  See Part 2 of the Charities Act 2011. For discussion, see Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) paras 4.33-4.37. 
81 On the concept of commodification generally and on the importance of a process-orientated analysis, see Noel 
Castree, ‘Commodifying What Nature?’ (2003) 27(3) Progress in Human Geography 273, 277; Scott Prudham, 
‘Commodification’, in N Castree et al (eds), A Companion to Environmental Geography (Wiley-Blackwell 
2009) 123.  
82 Castree, ‘Commodifying’ (n 81) 279-283. 
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available for biodiversity protection and enhancement.83 In the United States, the proliferation of 
easements has been linked to ‘hollowing out of public financing for land acquisition and increased 
resistance to land-use regulation.’84  
 
In addition to prioritising particular, private, human interests, the proposed covenant further implies 
abstraction of environmental features from their ecological contexts. Individuation ‘involves putting 
legal and material boundaries around phenomena so that they can be bought, sold and used by equally 
‘bounded’ individuals, groups or institutions’.85 The creation of a conservation covenant would 
necessitate reduction of what may be a complex and continuously evolving range of activities to a 
calculus that is sufficiently certain to be enforceable.  The potential use of covenants to support trade 
in biodiversity offsets (or other ecological services) would transform a previously inalienable resource 
(such as the biodiversity value of the land) into one upon which a market could be built.86 Something 
that previously appeared physically inseparable from the land itself could now be detached in 
exchange for payment.87  
 
Property law values stability and predictability; the object of property rights is required to have an 
identity that is relatively constant across space and time.88 This is not the case with ecological 
phenomena, which are often unstable, mobile and potential rather than fixed or static.89 An act of 
translation is required to enable ecological information to be meaningful in the legal domain; adopting 
a systems-theoretical analysis, Robertson argues that scientists cannot provide the necessary 
                                                          
83 A concern noted by M Hannis and S Sullivan, Offsetting Nature? Habitat Banking and Biodiversity Offsets in 
the English Land Use Planning System (2012) Technical Report, Green House 14. 
84 Amy Wilson Morris and Adena R Rissman, ‘Public Access to Information on Private Land Conservation: 
Tracking Conservation Easements’ (2009) Wis L R 1237, 1244.  
85 Castree, ‘Commodifying’ (n 81) 280; see also David Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of 
Difference (Blackwell 1996) 153. 
86 On the role of covenants in carbon trading in the United States, see sources at ns 34; 36. 
87 Fitting Castree’s definition of alienability: ‘Commodifying’ (n 81) 279-280. 
88 This is a basic assumption of most property scholarship, see eg Gray and Gray, Land Law (n 13) paras 1.7.9-
1.7.10. 
89 This is particularly true in the case of animals, see for example the discussion of black redstarts in Steve 
Hinchcliffe, ‘Reconstituting Nature Conservation: Towards a Careful Political Ecology’ (2008) 39 Geoforum 
85. However, the complexity of any ecological phenomena is a barrier to the imposition of fixed categories; see 
Morgan M Robertson, ‘The nature that capital can see: science, state, and market in the commodification of 
ecosystem services’ (2006) 24(3) Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 367. 
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information in an uncontroversial way.90 Ecological and scientific coherence could thus require to be 
sacrificed in order to produce a covenant agreement that was legally and economically coherent. 
Whether or not this view is accepted, there would be both legal and practical reasons91 to restrict 
covenant terms to features that were easily observable and measurable. For example, a prohibition on 
building would be far easier to monitor than a restriction on introduction of non-native species or an 
injunction to maintain diversity of forest ‘stand’ age. Indeed, it has been argued to be difficult to 
protect more complex values using a static, perpetual mechanism.92  
 
The individuation process risks the complex and chaotic nature of biological systems becoming 
obscured by a focus on discrete elements of ecosystem function.93 There is a tension between 
valuation of biodiversity function (which does not obey spatial boundaries and is difficult to separate 
on any given plot from the function of the landscapes surrounding it) and valuation on an acreage 
basis (which does not assist in assessing the ecological values of the site in comparison with others).94 
This links to the idea of abstraction. Castree95 identifies two dimensions to abstraction – functional 
and spatial.  Functional abstraction involves particular qualities, such as the biodiversity ‘value’ of a 
piece of land, being separated from the ‘messy uniqueness of the physical site’.96 This is intimately 
connected to spatial abstraction: the specificity of place-in-itself loses importance and becomes 
merely an example of a broader category of, for example, ‘wetland’ or ‘forest’ habitat.  
 
Any attempt to translate ecological value into legal protection entails a certain level of abstraction. 
However, the proposed covenant lacks the nexus between persons and place that plays a critical role 
in justifying other private law rules restricting land use. The benefit of the covenant would no longer 
be rooted within the particular social and ecological context of the locality, but would instead be 
                                                          
90 Robertson, ‘Nature’ (n 89) 370. Robertson’s argument here draws on difficulties with wetland banking in the 
United States. 
91 Although it seems that only extremely vague covenant terms would be likely to be struck down altogether, as 
for example the prohibition on ‘unseemly’ buildings in Murray v Dunn [1907] AC 283, terms that required 
protracted negotiation or even litigation to determine whether they applied in a given instance would provide 
little practical benefit.  
92 Jessica Owley, ‘Conservation Easements at the Climate Change Crossroads’ (2011)74 LCP 199, 226-228. 
93 A problem that Carol Rose describes as ‘partial propertisation’: ‘The Several Futures of Property’ (1998) 83 
Minn L Rev 129, 170-171. See also N Kosoy and E Corbera, ‘Payments for Ecosystem Services as Commodity 
Fetishism’ (2010) 69 Ecological Economics 1228, 1232. 
94 A problem also present in forms of offsetting such as wetlands banking: Morgan M Robertson, ‘No Net Loss: 
Wetland Restoration and the Incomplete Capitalization of Nature’ (2000) 32(4) Antipode 463, 479. 
95 ‘Commodifying’ (n 81) 281. 
96 Robertson, ‘Restoration’ (n 94) 473. See also Robertson, ‘Nature’ (n 89) 373.  
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directed at a diffuse, disparate and potentially conflicting public. The traditional structure of a 
freehold covenant necessitates a relation between two neighbouring pieces of land (the ‘touch and 
concern’ rule).97 The fact that enforcement of such covenants is, at least in theory, embedded in the 
specificity of the neighbour relation and a community of interests based on proximity and shared 
amenity preserves some link to the particularity of place. In the case of a conservation covenant, the 
connection between the responsible body and the burdened land would be of an altogether more 
nebulous character; although the covenant would require to have a conservation purpose, its terms 
would not necessarily reflect the full range of purposes and interests that might be relevant. Instead, a 
particular version of the public interest would be protected by an organisation representing the public.  
 
5.2. Environmental Justice Implications 
 
These features have important implications from an environmental justice perspective. Building on 
the themes of abstraction and displacement, this section argues that the proposed covenant could 
foster the uneven distribution of ecological risks and benefits. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
explore the various meanings that may be ascribed to the term ‘environmental justice’98 and its 
explanatory power compared to alternative concepts such as ‘political ecology’99 or ‘ecological 
justice’.100 ‘Environmental justice’ is used here in a broad sense to draw attention to the substantive 
relation between social and economic justice and ecology and the role that exclusion from decision-
making can play in the production of environmental and social inequalities. Discussion is principally 
concerned with the fairness of land-use decision-making procedures, but this is arguably related to 
substantive environmental outcomes.101 If environmental goods are conceptualised as being a matter 
                                                          
97 See P and A Swift Investments v Combined English Stores Group Plc [1989] AC 632; Gray and Gray, Land 
Law (n 13) paras 3.3.7-3.3.9. 
98 The meanings which may be attributed to ‘environmental justice’ are rich and plural; on some of the recent 
debates see David Schlosberg, ‘Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse’ (2013) 
22 Environmental Politics 37. For a UK perspective, see Ole W Pedersen ‘Environmental justice in the UK: 
uncertainty, ambiguity and the law’ (2011) 31(2) LS 279.  
99 See e.g Erik Swyngedouw and Nikolas C Heynen, ‘Urban Political Ecology, Justice and the Politics of Scale’ 
(2003) 35(5) Antipode 898. 
100 See for example Klaus Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance 
(Ashgate 2008) ch 3 and discussion in David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, 
Movements, and Nature (OUP 2007) ch 8. 
101 Many definitions of environmental justice link the need for equal protection from environmental harm to the 
procedural question of access to decision-making processes; see, for example, that of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency: https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice. The link between procedural and 
substantive is also recognised by in the preamble to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
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of private rights and interest, this would also change how people think about and value these goods: 
‘property disciplines both owners and non-owners to become market subjects’.102 
 
The theoretical possibilities that the proposals offer for individual involvement in environmental 
governance may obscure the reality that some groups are much better equipped to advance their 
interests through participation than others.103 Communities that are already disadvantaged and lacking 
in social and economic capital would be unlikely to be agents in processes of covenant creation, 
whether as covenantors or by involvement in the activities of responsible bodies.104 Indeed, it would 
be likely to be wealthy landowners of large land parcels who were best placed to benefit from the 
opportunities offered by conservation covenants, particularly if  tax incentives were to be available.105 
The values of affluent, conservation-minded individuals could conflict with the knowledge and 
practices of surrounding communities.106 The use of conservation covenants is not, therefore, a neutral 
or technical move but part of what Harvey describes as ‘the instantiation in nature of a certain regime 
of values’.107  
 
The proposed use of covenants in offsetting has raised fears that development pressures on green 
spaces will increase, development being ‘offset’ by the creation or maintenance of natural sites 
elsewhere which may not be accessible to the same communities (or may not be publicly accessible at 
                                                          
(UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters (Aarhus, 25 June 1998) (‘the Aarhus Convention’). 
102 Becky Mansfield, ‘Privatisation: Property and the Remaking of Nature-Society Relations’ (2007) Antipode 
393, 396. 
103 Riikka Paloniemi et al., ‘Public Participation and Environmental Justice in Biodiversity Governance in 
Finland, Greece, Poland and the UK’ (2015) 25 Environmental Policy and Governance 330, 339 note that 
‘while on the one hand we see the increasing inclusion of specific, often powerful, actors with rather vague 
criteria, on the other we see the increasing exclusion of other, less powerful, social groups or even the 
suppression of local struggles’. 
104 Katie Moon et al., ‘Personal circumstances and social characteristics as determinants of landholder 
participation in biodiversity conservation programs’ (2012) 113 Journal of Environmental Management 292 
highlight the importance of existing social capital in facilitating participation.  
105 Easements are argued to have benefited wealthy landowners in the US: Amy Wilson Morris, ‘Easing 
conservation? Conservation easements, public accountability and neoliberalism’ (2008) 39 Geoforum 1215, 
1217. 
106 On cultural differences between covenantors and local farmers in Australia, see Harrington et al, ‘Learning’ 
(n 62). 
107 Harvey, Justice (n 85) 119. 
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all).108  In such a context, overall ecological function would be prioritised at the expense of the 
specificity of place; it is argued below that the relatively closed sphere of private law adjudication is 
not a suitable forum for making this type of sensitive decision.  
 
If conservation covenants were to be used to facilitate the creation of markets in environmental goods 
and services, there would be a risk that they would simply ‘stabilise [the pre-existing] capitalist 
relations of power and accumulation’.109 Reliance on private agency does not address the current 
marginalisation of individuals and groups lacking market power, but appears likely to perpetuate and 
reproduce existing socio-economic hierarchies.110 Although the proposed covenant must provide 
public benefit, the reference to the ‘public’ does not appear to mean that the benefit is embedded 
within any particular actual community. Nor is public access to conserved land necessary;111 a 
covenant might ‘add to the general public wellbeing whether or not the public is able to visit, to 
observe, or to touch what is being conserved.’112 As presented in their Report, the Commission 
proposals seem likely to continue  existing patterns of social exclusion. 
6. Improving the governance of the covenant structure6.1  Participation and legitimacy 
There is no simple way to resolve these difficulties. One response to the risks associated with 
commodification would be a comprehensive reorientation of environmental policy. Failing this, this 
section considers the extent to which there may be opportunities to improve the equity, and perhaps 
the effectiveness, of the Commission proposals. It engages with questions of administrative 
legitimacy,113  and the need for adequate forums and processes for making decisions about land use 
the impacts of which are ultimately collective and public.114 It is suggested that participation of a more 
                                                          
108 In the US context, Ruhl and Salzman argue that wetland banking policies have resulted in a redistribution of 
wetlands from urban areas to rural ones, with important ecological and social impacts: J B Ruhl and James 
Salzman, ‘The Effects of Wetland Mitigation Banking on People’ (2006) 28 National Wetlands Newsletter 1. 
109 Shannon Logan and Gerda Wekerle, ‘Neoliberalising Environmental Governance? Land Trusts, Private 
Conservation and Nature on the Oak Ridges Moraine’ (2008) 39 Geoforum 2097, 2100. 
110 A point made eg by Kosoy and Corbera, ‘Payments’ (n 93) 1234.  
111 Bray, ‘Reconciling’ (n 28) 163 refers to public access as creating a ‘unique synergy between community 
involvement and increased conservation value’. However, evidence suggests that the majority of US 
conservation easements make no provision for public access; see Kay, ‘Breaking’ (n 57) 12. 
112 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 3.22. 
113 On the importance of administrative legitimacy in environmental decision-making, see Elizabeth Fisher, 
‘Unpacking the Toolbox: Or Why the Public/Private Divide is Important in EC Environmental Law’, in M 
Freedland and J B Auby (eds), The Public Law/Private Law Divide: une entente assez cordiale? (Hart 2006) 
215.  
114 The continuing relevance of governance issues is recognised by Reid and Nsoh, Privatisation (n 31) para 
2.14. 
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diverse range of actors in monitoring and better access to information would improve any reform 
introduced. However, the private nature of the mechanism implies that it would be inappropriate for 
private agreements to play a major role in determining conservation priorities.   
 
Detailed exploration of forms of participation is outwith the scope of this article,115 but argument here 
is premised on the view that there is a meaningful distinction between direct involvement by the 
public in elements of the covenanting process and representation of the community interest by 
established organisations such as public authorities or large conservation charities.116 Following 
Arnstein’s influential conceptualisation of participation as ‘redistribution of power’,117 discussion 
focuses on the extent to which a range of individuals and groups may have meaningful opportunities 
to influence outcomes. Participation is understood as requiring more than simply co-option into a 
dominant culture or discourse but rather in a richer sense as opportunity for recognition.118 The 
Commission proposals allow for the public to participate indirectly through involvement with 
responsible bodies, but the points made earlier about abstraction and displacement emphasise the need 
for opportunities to participate at a variety of scales and intensities.119 Although participation is no 
panacea,120 it may help, in a small way, to ensure that the presence of multiple, competing interests is 
made visible. 
6.2 Covenant creation and agenda setting 
 
Regardless of any efforts that may be made to increase participation, it is submitted that voluntary 
agreements are essentially a poor means of setting collective land-use priorities. Landowners would 
                                                          
115 For discussion of possible typologies of participation, see Mark S Reed, ‘Stakeholder participation for 
environmental management: A literature review’ (2008) 141(10) Biological Conservation 2417 and Barry 
Barton, ‘Underlying Concepts and Theoretical Issues in Public Participation in Resources Development’, in 
Donald M Zillman et al. (eds), Human Rights in Natural Resource Development: Public Participation in the 
Sustainable Development of Mining and Energy Resources (OUP 2002) 77. 
116 Difficulties with selective participation by well-organised groups are highlighted by Yvonne Rydin and Mark 
Pennington, ‘Public Participation and Local Environmental Planning: the collective action problem and the 
potential of social capital’ (2000) 5(2) Local Environment 153, 165. 
117 Sherry Arnstein, ‘A Ladder of Citizen Participation’ (1969) 35(4) Journal of the American Institute of 
Planners 216 
118 On recognition, see Adrian Martin et al., ‘Global environmental justice and biodiversity conservation’ (2013) 
179 Geographical Journal 122. 
119 Different problems may require different participatory strategies; see eg Rydin and Pennington, 
‘Participation’ (n 116).  
120 For example Frances Cleaver, ‘Paradoxes of Participation: Questioning Participatory Approaches to 
Development’ (1999) 11 Journal of International Development 597; Mohan and Stokke, ‘Empowerment’ (n 1). 
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retain the power to determine covenant content; it would be antithetical to the private and voluntary 
scheme proposed by the Commission for members of the public to have control over the terms of a 
covenant. The environmental justice concerns set out above imply that social and political conflict 
over land uses, which may involve choice between different environmental amenities and public 
benefits, is unlikely to be resolved equitably by private initiative alone.  In the current English law, 
individual proprietary rights have been argued to exist in the context of a ‘socially constituted and 
dynamic’ system of determining land-use rights through administrative processes that generally 
provide some opportunities for public participation and deliberation.121  In the longer term, a regime 
that lacks legitimacy is unlikely to provide the basis for a sustainable land-use policy.122  
 
A scheme based on private initiative may also lack ecological efficacy. The Law Commission 
proposals do not include any formal provision for responsible bodies to work together to co-ordinate 
activities.  A covenant relating to a single landholding may not adequately acknowledge the existence 
of ecological networks and the dependence of one biodiversity feature on numerous other ecological 
features both within the parcel of land and elsewhere.123 Where land values are high, efforts to address 
fragmentation through property-by-property restrictions could well fail.124 The risk of leakage 
(displacement of the harmful activity restricted by the covenant) would remain high if there were no 
broader scheme of land-use planning. Protection through individual covenants could fail to address 
cumulative impacts: for example, low-impact development on one land parcel may not significantly 
damage biodiversity but could contribute to a detrimental trend.125  
 
Further, the private nature of the proposed covenant implies that it would not necessarily have the 
same legal status as a designation under one of the various public law regimes affecting, for example, 
                                                          
121 Eloise Scotford and Rachael Walsh, ‘The Symbiosis of Property and English Environmental Law – Property 
Rights in a Public Law Context’ (2013) 76 MLR 1010, 1025. 
122 The fundamental importance of legitimacy is emphasised by Scotford and Walsh, ‘Symbiosis’ (n 121) 1043-
1044. 
123 The need for coherence is recognised eg by Reid, ‘Privatisation’ (n 23) 224. Data from the US indicates that 
development density in the surrounding area has a greater effect on some biodiversity variables than the 
existence of a conservation easement: Amy Pocewicz et al., ‘Effectiveness of Conservation Easements for 
Reducing Development and Maintaining Biodiversity in Sagebrush Ecosystems’ (2011) 144 Biological 
Conservation 567, 573. 
124 For a US case study in which easements did not prevent ecological fragmentation, see Rissman, ‘Rethinking’ 
(n 71) 228. 
125 For examples of this problem in the US context see Adena R Rissman et al., ‘Conservation Easements: 
Biodiversity Protection and Private Use’ (2007) 21(3) Conservation Biology 709, 716. 
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sites of special scientific interest and national parks.126 In Australia, sites protected by covenants have 
been affected by the exploitation of mineral rights as such rights are owned separately from the rights 
to use the surface;127 it would be theoretically possible for this to occur in England.128 It seems 
unlikely that the fact that land was protected by a covenant would prevent licenses for unconventional 
means of energy production and exploration such as hydraulic fracturing being granted.129Although in 
the absence of powers of compulsory extinction130  a covenant would not be affected by the grant of 
planning or other regulatory consent in respect of the surface land, this would probably lead to an 
application for modification or discharge, issues relating to  which are discussed below. 
 
6.3 Access to information 
 
In order to ensure that land-use conflict was addressed in a democratic and transparent manner, public 
access to information about covenants and their role in land-use decision-making would be crucial. 
Proper and effective monitoring of the effects of any reform requires affected communities to have 
access to information about the existence of covenants and also monitoring activities. Scientific 
access to data on covenants would also bring many benefits such as increased understanding of 
                                                          
126 The problem of coordination between the various regimes is raised eg by Reid, ‘Privatisation’ (n 23) 224-
225. In the absence of express legal provision, covenants would be unaffected by existing statutory designations 
and the possibility of conflict would have to be considered when drafting covenant terms. 
127 Vanessa M Adams and Katie Moon, ‘Security and equity of conservation covenants: Contradictions of 
private protected area policies in Australia’ (2013) 30 Land Use Policy 114, 117. 
128 Mineral rights in England may also be owned separately from the rights to use the surface – see Gray and 
Gray, Land Law (n 13) para 1.2.18 - and the surface landowner cannot necessarily refuse to allow these rights to 
be exploited. For example, under the terms of the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act 1966 and the 
Petroleum Act 1998, if rights to use the surface land for extractive operations and access cannot be obtained by 
private bargain on reasonable terms, they may be granted by court order.   
129 ss 43-48 of the Infrastructure Act 2015 give the right to use deep-level land for petroleum exploration 
without the consent of the surface landowner. The Onshore Hydraulic Fracturing (Protected Areas) Regulations 
2016 indicate only limited protection may be offered to significant natural sites – SSSIs for example are not 
mentioned. For exploration of land-use conflicts in the context of renewable and unconventional energy 
production, see Gerald Korngold, ‘Conservation Easements and the Development of New Energies: Fracking, 
Wind Turbines, and Solar Collection’ (2014) 3 Louisiana State University Journal of Energy Law and 
Resources 101. 
130 Such as those set out in s 237 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 which, along with analogous 
provisions, would continue to apply to the proposed covenant: Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 7.115. 
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climate change impacts.131 Were conservation obligations to be required as mitigation for 
environmental harms, public scrutiny would be particularly important.132 There are fears, however that 
the introduction of conservation covenants could actually weaken public access to environmental 
information.133  
 
At a general level, the increased involvement of private actors in environmental protection may 
negatively affect the way that the public interest in access to information is perceived and 
implemented. The use of conservation easements in relation to privately owned land in the United 
States appears to have fostered concern about privacy, in particular a misapprehension that 
information about the existence of covenants might lead the public to believe that access rights exist 
(which would not be the case for some or perhaps many covenants).134 Rather than nurturing an ethic 
of community, linking conservation activities to a sphere understood as bounded and protected from 
outside intrusion diminishes the desire to share information. Framing an issue in terms of the private 
rights of the landowner focuses debate on protection of privacy interests rather than the collective 
problem of access to environmental information.  
 
The Law Commission suggest that, in order to be enforceable against successors, covenants should be 
registered as local land charges on the Land Charges register.135 It is thought to be impracticable to 
have any central registration of covenants that would permit analysis of their use across England,136 
but it is recommended that responsible bodies should make information available to the relevant 
Secretary of State about agreements to which they are party.137 This would allow information about 
covenants to be disseminated in compliance with the Environmental Information Regulations 2004138 
                                                          
131 Indeed there may be an ethical obligation to make this data available: James L Olmstead, ‘The Invisible 
Forest: Conservation Easement Databases and the End of Clandestine Conservation of Natural Lands’ (2011) 74 
LCP 51, 63. 
132 This public aspect is emphasised by Morris and Rissman, ‘Access’ (n 84) 1240. 
133  See eg Reid, ‘Privatisation’ (n 23) 226. 
134 Morris and Rissman, ‘Access’ (n 84) 1267.  
135 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 5.66. 
136 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) paras 5.64; 5.71. The fact that covenants are understood as a statutory 
burden rather than an interest in land is argued to prevent registration in the Land Register, but this seems an 
unsatisfactory position given the manifold benefits of centralised registration. There are also strong arguments 
that the proposed covenant would have many of the characteristics of a proprietary interest and would not 
therefore be out of place in the Land Register; see Pratt, ‘Covenants’ (n 12). 
137 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) paras 5.86-5.87.  
138 SI 2004/3391. 
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but would not ensure that information about, for example, monitoring and enforcement, was collected 
in adequate detail. 
 
These proposals do not go far enough. Despite the widespread use of conservation easements in the 
United States, there is no publicly accessible data showing how exactly how many conservation 
easements exist or where they are located.139 There is a disjuncture between the spatial and temporal 
scales at which easements operate and the scale at which data is collected.140 The Law Commission 
refute concerns based on this experience, arguing that, as land-use planning is already locally 
organised, local registration is consistent with the English policy context.141 This response does not 
take sufficient account, however, of the increased need for transparency given the lack of public 
participation in decision-making about covenants, the fact that there would be a strong public and 
academic interest in access to national-scale data about how any new mechanism is being used and 
the risk that important information about the condition and ongoing status of covenant-protected sites 
would not be collected at all.  
 
It would be especially important that the social and ecological distribution of benefits and burdens be 
carefully scrutinised if publicly funded incentives were to be offered.  The Commission position is 
that its recommendations should not be regarded as a tax mitigation tool.142 However, the tax 
implications of any scheme might only emerge after implementation. Reid identifies potential for 
reduction of inheritance tax and stamp duty land tax liabilities;143 it seems likely that there would also 
be capital gains tax consequences if a covenant were viewed as reducing the value of a property.144 
Currently available capital gains and inheritance tax relief for owners of ‘national heritage assets’ 
                                                          
139 See eg Olmstead, ‘Databases’ (n 131); Morris and Rissman, ‘Access’ (n 84). A voluntary database, the 
National Conservation Easement Database, exists: see http://conservationeasement.us/. 
140 Morris and Rissman, ‘Access’ (n 84) 1241.  
141 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 5.78. 
142 Covenants (n 2) para 2.5. 
143 Colin T Reid, ‘Conservation Covenants’ (2013) Conv 176, 181. 
144 Reid notes that stricter restrictions on development in the UK may mean that a covenant would not affect the 
value of the property, but if a covenant did not provide any additional protection against environmental 
degradation this would call into question the benefit of introducing the mechanism; see Reid, ‘Conservation 
Covenants’ (n 143) fn 38. 
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(these may include land or other forms of heritage such as artworks) made publicly accessible145 has 
been criticised for providing inadequate levels of access in return for the funding given.146  
The compulsory collection and dissemination of more extensive information about covenant creation 
and monitoring would thus  be necessary to ensure that any new scheme could be evaluated robustly. 
 
6.4 Accountability and participation in monitoring and enforcement 
 
The need for legitimacy and accountability is additionally crucial to the design of systems for 
monitoring and enforcement of conservation covenants. There is no guarantee that a covenant would 
function effectively at all. Enforcement of private agreements by parties who do not hold 
neighbouring land fundamentally changes the interests involved: enforcement is no longer the private 
right of a neighbour but the public concern of a conservation organisation or other responsible body. 
Entering into new covenants may hold many attractions for conservation bodies, but it is extremely 
important to ensure that adequate resources are set aside for long-term monitoring and enforcement of 
agreements.147 There is a basic asymmetry of information between the occupier of the land and the 
responsible body;148 where a large parcel of land is involved, terms such as restrictions on hunting 
may be difficult or impossible to monitor on a day-to-day basis.149  
 
In jurisdictions such as Australia where conservation covenants have been widely used, academics 
have criticised a lack of standardisation in approaches to monitoring and evaluation.150  Further, 
covenant effectiveness may have decreased over time: landowner enthusiasm has been identified as a 
potential obstacle to achieving biodiversity outcomes where the burdened party is not the original 
                                                          
145 See further Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), Capital taxation and the national heritage 
(2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/capital-taxation-and-tax-exempt-heritage-
assets.  
146 See eg M Brown and N Gil, ‘Tax exemption for public access to treasured artworks is ‘a racket’’ The 
Guardian (London, 27th December 2013), <http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2013/dec/27/tax-
exemption-public-access-treasured-artworks-racket>. On problems in the US, see D Halperin, ‘Incentives for 
Conservation Easements: The Charitable Deduction or a Better Way?’ (2011) 74 LCP 29; Bray, ‘Reconciling’ 
(n 28) 146-147. 
147 The need for careful financial planning is highlighted by Green Balance, Potential (n 73) 36. 
148 A point highlighted by Hodge, ‘Covenants’ (n 10) 496. 
149 For examples, see Rissman, ‘Rethinking’ (n 71) 226. 
150 J A Fitzsimons and C B Carr, ‘Conservation Covenants on Private Land: Issues with Measuring and 
Achieving Biodiversity Outcomes in Australia’ (2014) 54 Environmental Management 606, 614.  
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convenantor.151As most Australian covenants were only established relatively recently (from 1980 
onwards), many may still be in the hands of the original covenantor or their close relatives; it is 
unknown how the passage of longer periods of time will affect compliance with covenant terms.152  
 
It is significant that the proximity requirement that usually applies to restrictive freehold covenants 
means that monitoring and enforcement will happen almost automatically: if a neighbour’s interests 
are genuinely harmed by breach of a covenant, he or she will usually be aware that this is the case. 
However, where the interest enforced is public rather than private the question of monitoring is more 
complicated. Due to the inadequate provision for information dissemination identified earlier, those 
geographically close to the land might have no idea of a covenant’s existence. Although a large 
environmental organisation can be assumed to be ideologically committed to adequate enforcement, 
its interest is of a very different character to the interest of a neighbouring landowner in his or her 
private amenity and may well require to be balanced against various other organisational concerns and 
objectives. Enforcement of obligations through the public land-use planning system guarantees at 
least a minimal degree of transparency and democratic accountability that does not exist in relation to 
the enforcement of property rights by private bodies.153 
 
If a covenant were to be breached, or its terms disputed, litigation costs could be substantial.154 
Smaller breaches would cause particular difficulties as the financial costs of legal action might often 
far outweigh the potential benefits. 155  Responsible bodies may, due to political reasons or resource 
constraints, be unable or unwilling to ensure strict compliance with agreements and the proposed 
scheme contains no formal system of public oversight.156 The Law Commission reject the idea of third 
                                                          
151 Fitzsimons and Carr, ‘Covenants’ (n 150) 611-612. See also A R Rissman and V Butsic, ‘Land trust defense 
and enforcement of conserved areas’ (2011) 4 Conservation Letters 31, 35.  
152As Rissman and Sayre argue, the success of any easement will depend not just on the content of the formal 
legal agreement but on the social relations between benefited party and landowner: ‘Outcomes’ (n 28). These 
will be strongly influenced by the individual personalities involved, which may vary if the land is transferred or 
there is a change of personnel at the relevant responsible body. See also Green Balance, Potential (n 73) 38. 
153 Of course, planning obligations are by no means a perfect mechanism: Carolyn Harrison and Tracey Bedford, 
‘Environmental Gains? Collaborative Planning, Planning Obligations, and Issues of Closure in Local Land-use 
Planning in the UK’, in Jane Holder and Carolyn Harrison (eds), Law and Geography (OUP 2003) 343. 
154   Several consultees raised concerns about the cost of injunctions, the Commission’s recommended primary 
enforcement mechanism: Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) paras 6.78-6.80. 
155 For examples of this in the US (where litigation costs may be even higher), see Rissman and Butsic, 
‘Defense’ (n 151) 34. 
156 The Commission do refer to the possibility of responsible bodies facing ‘public pressure and reputational loss 
(or even de-listing) for failing to enforce’: Covenants (n 2) paras 4.109-4.111. 
26 
 
party enforcement because this would be inconsistent with the private and voluntary character of the 
agreement.157 However, given the centrality of the public interest in environmental protection to the 
entire scheme, it is submitted that this argument does not adequately address the concerns that 
inadequate enforcement may raise. Although the burden of a conservation covenant falls on a private 
landowner, the benefit is avowedly public and communal.  Inclusion of a broader range of actors in 
the monitoring and enforcement process would enhance the equity, and perhaps also the 
environmental effectiveness,158 of the covenant mechanism.  
 
One obvious suggestion is oversight by a state body such as a local authority or a government 
agency.159 There is also the possibility of direct enforcement by members of affected local 
communities. At a basic level, residents could be encouraged to participate in responsible bodies’ 
monitoring activities. This could provide many of the benefits of private involvement identified in 
part four but would still leave monitoring policy entirely in the control of responsible bodies. A model 
for an independent power of public intervention might be the power of persons aggrieved by a 
statutory nuisance to, in summary proceedings, ask for an order requiring the nuisance to be abated 
and/or prohibiting its recurrence.160 These schemes would, however, be likely to decrease the 
willingness of landowners to burden their land with a conservation covenant.   
 
Similar issues arise when determining suitable remedies for breach of a covenant. The private and 
voluntary nature of the mechanism limits the extent to which a wider range of approaches and 
sanctions are thought to be appropriate.161 The remedies recommended by the Law Commission 
comprise specific performance, injunctive relief and damages (including exemplary damages in 
appropriate cases),162 but questions may be raised about how effective such a regime would be in 
practice in ensuring that a conservation covenant fulfils its stated objectives.  The barriers to obtaining 
                                                          
157 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 4.111. 
158 J Steele, ‘Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a Problem-solving Approach’ 
(2001) 21(3) OJLS 415 argues that participation may increase the quality of environmental decisions, 
particularly regarding the acceptability of risks. 
159 For discussion of public authority powers of intervention, see Reid, ‘Conservation Covenants’ (n 143) 184; J 
Pidot, ‘Conservation Easement Reform: As Maine Goes Should the Nation Follow? (2011) 74 LCP 1, 14-15. 
The Maine provisions are, however, premised on the inability of the responsible body to take action due to 
reasons such as bankruptcy or dissolution; the concerns raised here relate not just to inadequacy on the part of a 
responsible body but to the structure of the covenant mechanism. 
160 See s 82 Environmental Protection Act 1990. 
161 This is the implication of Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 6.93. 
162 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) paras 6.69-6.127. 
27 
 
appropriate relief might include ambiguity in the drafting of the covenant, the need to meet relevant 
standards of proof and the inadequacy of damages.163  
 
There exists no simple solution but punitive sanctions for landowners who deliberately breach a 
covenant might be desirable in some circumstances, depending on the seriousness of the harm caused 
and the presence of, for example, intent to profit fraudulently from it. The risk of fraud would be 
especially relevant if covenants were used in biodiversity offsetting or carbon sequestration 
ventures.164 Although the Commission recommendations allow for exemplary damages, questions can 
be raised about how appropriate it is to use this mechanism as a sanctions regime. There are strong 
arguments that any scheme designed to impose sanctions of a punitive nature requires more developed 
attention to appropriateness of sanction, evidential standards, defences and rights of appeal.165 
 
6.5  Modification and discharge 
The tension between flexibility and permanence166 raises further questions regarding the ability of a 
property mechanism to deal with change and conflict in a fair and transparent manner. It is 
acknowledged by the Commission that the temporal dimension of the covenant structure is 
problematic: short term goals are undesirable,167 as these would require regular variation, but 
environmental change168 or other political or social factors may mean that any long term obligations 
quickly become inappropriate or are so vague as to be meaningless.169 If covenants were to be used to 
secure compensatory measures in respect of developments causing permanent ecological damage, the 
conservation value created by the covenant would require to be perpetual but perpetual private 
ordering in relation to land use is particularly troubling as it restricts the autonomy of future 
                                                          
163 For examples of difficulties in the US and an argument that exemplary damages and criminal sanctions are 
important deterrents, see Ann Harris Smith, ‘Conservation Easement Violated: What Next? A Discussion of 
Remedies’ (2010) 20 Fordham Environmental Law Review 597. 
164 On existing problems with fraud in carbon trading, see Carole Gibbs and Michael Cassidy, ‘Crimes in the 
carbon market’, in Lorraine Elliot and William H Schaedla (eds), Handbook of Transnational Environmental 
Crime (Edward Elgar 2016) 235. 
165 See Richard Macrory, ‘Sanctions and Safeguards: The Brave New World of Regulatory Enforcement’ (2013) 
66 CLP 233. 
166 A point highlighted by Reid, ‘Conservation Covenants’ (n 143) 178-179. 
167 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 2.5. 
168 Climate change impacts are emphasised by Owley, ‘Crossroads’ (n 92) 206-208. For further references, see 
Korngold et al., ‘An Empirical Study of Modification and Termination of Conservation Easements: What the 
Data Suggest About Appropriate Legal Rules’ (2016) 24 NYU Environmental Law Journal 1, 23. 
169 See eg Owley, ‘Crossroads’ (n 92) 205-207. 
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individuals and communities to determine appropriate land-use patterns.170 It is unknown what the 
environmental needs of future generations may be, and whether they would be willing or able to 
enforce the terms of any particular covenant.171 
It follows from this that the promised perpetuity can only ever be an illusion.172 Given that biological 
systems are necessarily continuously adapting and evolving, conservation covenants would require to 
be drafted with this in mind and their objectives framed to focus on building resilience rather than 
achieving ‘conservation’ of a certain state.173 As Barritt has argued in relation to stewardship 
obligations, the object of the covenant would then require to be interpreted flexibly in line with the 
values it is designed to conserve.174 One suggestion made in the United States has been the use of 
shorter ‘renewable term’ easements.175 These would better reflect a cyclical, rather than a linear, 
approach to decision-making consistent with adaptive management paradigms.176  
However, this approach could imply a greater commitment to management and monitoring on the part 
of burdened owners.177 If a  covenant included positive obligations, this would further increase these 
costs, potentially jeopardising its attraction as a voluntary and flexible mechanism.178 More 
expenditure could also be required on enforcement, reducing the perceived efficiency benefits for 
conservation bodies of the covenant structure compared to outright ownership.179 Regular amendment 
                                                          
170 See for example J Owley, ‘Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of Perpetual 
Conservation Easements’ (2011) 30 Stan Env LJ 121, esp. at 154-155. Of cou rse, many land-use decisions, 
including a decision to develop, have permanent impacts on biological systems. 
171 Owley, ‘Changing’ (n 170) 169. 
172 A point highlighted by Pidot, ‘Reinventing’ (n 24) 22.  
173 On the general importance of resilience, see Jan McDonald and Megan C Styles, ‘Legal Strategies for 
Adaptive Management Under Climate Change’ (2014) 26 JEL 25,41-42. The difficulties presented by epistemic 
uncertainties in the natural sciences are highlighted by Adena R Rissman, ‘Designing Perpetual Conservation 
Agreements for Land Management’ (2010) 63 Rangeland Ecology and Management 167, 173-174. 
174 See Barritt, ‘Stewardship’ (n 59). 
175 See Owley, ‘Changing’ (n 170). 
176 On which see McDonald and Styles, ‘Strategies’ (n 173) 28-29. 
177 An argument made by Adena R Rissman et al., ‘Adapting Conservation Easements to Climate Change’ 
(2015) 8(1) Conservation Letters 68, 73. 
178 Lack of time to manage the property has been identified as an important obstacle to achieving biodiversity 
outcomes in Australia; see Fitzsimons and Carr, ‘Covenants’ (n 150) 612. See also Owley, ‘Crossroads’ (n 92) 
225-226. 
179 See Jessica Owley and Adena R Rissman, ‘Trends in private land conservation: Increasing complexity, 
shifting conservation purposes and allowable private land uses’ (2016) 52 Land Use Policy 76, 81; Owley, 
‘Crossroads’ (n 92) 225-226. 
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and review would add further costs for all parties involved.180 For this reason, responsible bodies 
might wish to avoid agreements involving complex management requirements.181 Alternatively, 
important provisions could be moved to management plans; these could be even more remote from 
public scrutiny than covenant terms.182 
 The Commission proposals regarding modification and discharge183 are consistent with the need to 
respond to environmental and social change.  However, they again raise the issue of protection of the 
public interest in a covenant. One of the factors proposed for consideration is the possibility of 
substitution of the benefits provided by the covenant for similar benefits under a scheme carried out 
on other land owned by the burdened party;184 public trust in covenants would be likely to be eroded if 
such substitutions took place regularly.  Moreover, how would the Lands Chamber take into account 
any incentives that had been offered to the original covenantor or, in the case of offsetting, the 
destruction of habitat that had taken place on the strength of the covenant? The circumstances in 
which the covenant was entered into might be relevant to the ‘extent to which the conservation 
covenant is in the public interest and designed to benefit the public’185 but the discretion afforded to 
the Lands Chamber to balance this against other factors and decide that modification or discharge is 
‘reasonable’ seems relatively wide.186  
 
Third parties might also have relied on the existence of the covenant in order to obtain a planning or 
other benefit; it seems likely that such persons would nevertheless bear no liability to ensure the 
covenant operated successfully and was appropriately monitored and enforced.187 There is 
additionally a risk that responsible bodies could agree to modification for reasons that do not strictly 
                                                          
180 Bray’s analysis of Massachusetts restrictions emphasises concern over future amendment costs: 
‘Reconciling’ (n 28) 140-145; 169-172. 
181 See eg the comments of the RSPB: E Comerford et al., Financing nature in an age of austerity, RSPB (2010) 
10. See also Green Balance, Potential (n 73) 14. 
182 See Owley and Rissman, ‘Trends’ (n 179) 82. Rissman notes that, due to issues with resources and 
enforceability, management plans were not a preferred tool for staff at The Nature Conservancy, one of the 
largest non-profit easement holders in the US: ‘Designing’ (n 173) 172. 
183 See 2.1 above. 
184 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 7.79. 
185 ibid. 
186 ibid.  
187 A similar problem arises when a covenant is entered into as part of a permit to ‘take’ endangered species 
under the Endangered Species Act in the US: Jessica Owley Lippmann, ‘Exacted Conservation Easements: The 
Hard Case of Endangered Species Protection’ (2004) 19 J Envtl L & Litig 293, 343. 
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reflect the conservation objectives embodied in the covenant; any ulterior motivations would be 
difficult for the Lands Chamber to assess.188  
 
The Commission reject any further form of oversight, such as a requirement for public consultation,189 
on the basis that this would reduce the flexibility of the system. It is certainly the case that increased 
participation might make the scheme less attractive to landowners, it would also be difficult to 
achieve within the structures associated with a private mechanism. The organisation of the 
adjudicative process as concerning principally the parties to the covenant limits the opportunities for 
full and open deliberation. For example, should a covenant protecting open space values be 
discharged to allow construction of wind turbines? The policy of the relevant responsible body and 
the wishes of the landowner are unlikely to be exhaustive of the range of possible views on this 
question.  
The bipolarity of the private law relationship190 means, however, that legal focus would be on gain by 
one party and correlative loss by the other, rather than the wider distribution of burdens and benefits 
in society. Another way of putting this point might, following Weinrib,191 be that private law 
adjudication generally involves corrective justice rather than distributive justice.  Without endorsing 
Weinrib’s exclusion of distributive justice from all private law adjudication, his contention that the 
structures of private law are poorly equipped to determine policies that affect the public as a whole 
remains relevant. There is some precedent for consideration of the circumstances in which a 
restrictive covenant was granted when considering whether it should be modified or discharged,192 but 
                                                          
188 Korngold et al., ‘Modification’ (n 168) 31 note that a significant proportion of the easement modifications 
studied had the potential to decrease conservation values but the process followed was opaque and it was 
impossible to be sure whether countervailing benefits were gained elsewhere. 
189 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 7.31. 
190 At least in terms of adjudicative structures: proprietary rights are generally understood as being exigible 
against the world in general but in order for a claimant to enforce a right in court a nexus between the claimant 
and a particular respondent is generally required. For further discussion, see L Smith, ‘Restitution: The Heart of 
Corrective Justice’ (2001) 79 Texas L Rev 2115. Developments in the English law of trespass allowing 
injunctions to be issued against ‘persons unknown’ (see Hampshire Waste Service v Persons Unknown [2003] 
EWHC 1738 (Ch)) complicate this picture somewhat but arguably a connection between one or more specific 
persons and the complainant is still necessary for such an order to be enforced. 
191 E J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012).  
192 See eg Re Beech's Application (1990) 59 P & CR 502; N D M Parry, ‘Discharge of Restrictive Covenants’ 
(1990) Conv 455. In Beech’s the applicants sought to discharge a covenant imposed by a local authority as part 
of a sale under the ‘right to buy’ provisions in the Housing Act 1985. The Tribunal declined the application, 
stating that they would support the Council’s imposition of a scheme of covenants as part of its obligation to 
manage housing stock.  
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this does not mean that the Lands Chamber is the best forum for this type of dialogue. If the ‘persons 
entitled to the benefit of the covenant’ were the general public, it should not be presumed that a 
responsible body could sufficiently represent all pertinent interests.  
 
7. Conclusion: Private Means for Public Ends? 
 
Proprietary mechanisms, such as restrictive covenants, are well suited to coordinating private 
interests. Their tendency towards coherence and certainty plays a valuable role in their justification, in 
what it means for them to be understood as just.193 The features that provide this consistency and 
stability, however, the abstraction from the chaotic realities of the material world and the 
circumscription of considerations and actors, also make them unsuitable for providing an 
environmental justice that is plural, participatory and concerned with both human and non-human 
communities. The Law Commission proposals for the introduction of a conservation covenant, while 
of great interest to property lawyers, seek to maintain an uneasy balance between public and private 
that may ultimately be detrimental to the scheme’s potential for social and environmental benefit.  
 
It is important to be clear about the strategic objectives of introducing conservation covenants and to 
identify what such mechanisms could achieve that existing processes cannot. The major question that 
this article has engaged with is whether covenants can empower private conservation activity while 
responding in a just manner to the ‘public, collective and competing needs’194 that characterise land-
use decision-making. The article has highlighted concerns that an increasing reliance on private actors 
and markets will advantage a narrow range of social and ecological interests, with significant 
environmental justice implications. It has focussed on public participation and access to information 
as means of increasing the inclusiveness and legitimacy of any reform, arguing that involvement of a 
broader range of actors is necessary to secure the kind of community benefit promised by the 
Commission proposals.195  
 
In this respect, the scheme proposed would be enhanced by the addition of opportunities for input by 
actual communities (rather than the responsible bodies who must be presumed to represent them) into 
the monitoring and enforcement of the obligations created.  Provision for more extensive central 
                                                          
193 One view of the importance of coherence in private law doctrine is that it requires a ‘single integrated 
justification’: Weinrib, Private Law (n 191) 32 ff. For a critique, see K Kress, ‘Coherence and Formalism’ 
(1993) 16 Harv J L & Pub Poly 639. Although Weinrib’s discussion of the justificatory role of coherence is 
valuable, the term ‘coherence’ is used here in a wider sense.  
194 Scotford and Walsh, ‘Symbiosis’ (n 121) 1016. 
195 Eg Bray, ‘Reconciling’ (n 28) 151; Hodge, ‘Covenants’ (n 10) 494-495. 
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collection and dissemination of information about conservation covenants would further improve their 
governance.  However, the primary role of the parties to a conservation covenant limits the extent to 
which it could be a suitable mechanism for setting or securing public conservation priorities; this is 
reflected in the limited scope for public involvement in covenant creation and modification or 
discharge. These are not necessarily arguments against the introduction of any form of conservation 
covenant, but do point to the need for reflection on the private nature of the mechanism and an 
acknowledgement of its limitations.   
 
  
 
